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M O H A M M E D  A .  B A M Y E H The vast majority of works containing in 
their title the term “civil society” or other 
related items, such as the “public sphere,” 
date from the latter part of the 1990’s. 
The intellectual genealogy of such 
concepts as “the public sphere” or “civil 
society” are rooted in European social 
history, thus they need to be adjusted 
somewhat when applied to other parts 
of the world to allow for local and regional histories and experiences. One 
approach would be to begin with a survey of the subject in question, not 
with the concept itself. Through such an approach one may reconfigure 
the concept of “civil society” in ways that are at once appropriate to local 
circumstances and informed by global patterns and trends. What would 
such a survey look for? 
If we think of civil society, in its most general sense, as society organ-
ized outside of the state, we can readily identify various corresponding 
historical lineages and categories of social organization in the Muslim 
world. Many of those lineages may have little to do with “Islam” as an 
idea or even as social practice. Rather, they exist in a discursive con-
text where Islam operates generally as a namesake of collective cul-
ture. These lineages may include, for 
example, “tribe,” “millet,” “family,” “urban 
notables” (ayan), “merchants,” “colonial 
bourgeoisie,” or the “learned networks” 
(ulama). Despite overlaps in member-
ship to a given group, each category 
presupposes a quite distinct social 
worldview, rules of membership, and 
patterns of relations to the outside—
i.e. to other groups as well as to the state. 
An approach of this kind possesses many advantages. First, it frees 
the very concept of civil society from the specificities of the European 
bourgeois experience, making it possible to detect different permuta-
tions and possibilities within the larger social environs of Islam. Second, 
it allows for a grounding of civil society in a rich historical matrix rather 
than positing it as a specific outcome of modernity and thus a mark of 
a break from the past. Third, it situates the study of civil society within 
a larger repertoire of existing scholarship which may not explicitly or 
consciously explore civil society as such. Fourth, it allows a proper ap-
praisal of non state-centred social formations and ideas, and as such 
detects civil society’s sui generis manner of life, away from the grip of a 
state-centred “oriental despotism” framework. 
Historical genealogies of civil society 
Historical categories embodied in such terms as “tribe,” “millet,” 
“ayan,” and “ulama” help to explain how mores and norms of civic cul-
ture evolved when states appeared to most of their subject popula-
tion as transient, half-legitimate, unpredictable, or self-serving. Under 
conditions typified by incomplete state diffusion into society—that 
is, for most of Islamic history—the civic mores governing social and 
economic life evolved out of patterns of everyday life and remained 
more negotiable than the usually distant or unaccountable state. Such 
mores of civic life included not simply minor everyday transactions 
but also larger questions of “moral authority” and “justice.”
Literature in the social history of Islam widely confirms that basic 
social structures of obligations and reciprocity tended to become less 
reliable once they reached the level of state politics. One general and 
persistent expectation was that the state transformed far more the 
personality of those who governed it than the culture and ethics of 
the population it governed. The expectation that rulers could not be 
counted upon to fulfil social obligations they otherwise would be be-
holden to, was basic to Ibn Khaldun’s theory of dynastic change. Like-
wise, the notion that governing was by its very nature “infertile” (al-
mulk aqim),1 flowed from the principle that a person could no longer 
be expected to act in accordance with ordinary ethics or rules of social 
obligations once he assumed the rule of a state. 
The Islamic “mirror of princes” genre confirms the notion that govern-
ing a state could not simply be informed by common ethical norms. 
Basing their work on the experiences of different Islamic states, such 
varied commentators as Nizam al-Mulk, Ibn al-Muqaffa, At-Tartushi, 
Ash-Shatibi, or Al-Muradi, all took for granted centuries before the writ-
ings of Machiavelli, a principle which in recent times has been traced 
by Michel Foucault only to Machiavelli, namely the “exteriority of the 
prince to the principality.” The common expectation was that the state 
had its own autonomous ethics, whose autogenesis lay in the logic of 
the state itself rather than in the prior ethics of any other social catego-
ry (e.g. tribe or class). The state thus did not flow naturally from social 
developments; it was parasitic upon society, and the role of religion 
was in effect to limit its despotism rather than justify it. Richard Bulliet 
has argued that “Islam” functioned historically in a manner equivalent 
to that of “the people” in the West, namely as a source of limitation on 
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activity of the ulama a means of limiting despotism—especially in their 
self-designated role as “heirs” to the prophet, in a different and some-
what balancing way to the idea of the “caliph.”3 
Indeed, the idea that Islam possesses an inherent civic character 
seems to be spurring a flurry of recent studies (e.g. Sohail Hashmi, 
Abdulaziz Sachedina, Ahmad Moussalli, to highlight just a few), which 
seek to articulate a theoretical conception of civil society on the bases 
of classical Islamic traditions rather than European theories. Such ap-
proaches are clearly illuminating. However, they frequently miss an im-
portant starting point, which involves identifying the basis of historical 
civil society not so much in “doctrines” as in social conditions, settings, 
requirements, and experiences.
Charting out such social foundations helps us approximate models 
and parameters of civil society in the Muslim world in ways that are his-
torically informed as well as relevant to the present. If the unrelenting 
authoritarian hold of the modern Arab state in particular is explained 
by the fact that the state itself remains contested from within and thus 
has a reason for paranoia, we may infer that such a state never man-
aged to replace social structures that had been built over centuries and 
in such a way as to outlast the contingency of states. The evolution of 
modern states in the Middle East required moving directly against three 
distinct historical principles which were essential to the civic culture of 
global Islam: namely, the principle of partial control; the principle of 
free movement; and the principle of cultural heteroglossia4. These were 
precisely the principles that had provided the supportive conditions in 
Islamic history for the networks, institutions, habits, and practices that 
at a later point in Europe would be captured as “civil society” by Locke, 
Hegel, and Tocqueville. Beyond the Islamic experience, these very prin-
ciples also seem to inform the organizational and ideational logic of 
the emergent global civil society today. 
Civil society groups and state building
Voluntary civic life is often deformed by states’ efforts at cooptation. 
An encounter between state and tribe, for example, almost always re-
sults in either endangering the existence of the tribe, or in distorting 
the character and function of the tribe.5 A revealing exception how ever 
is the case of Yemen, where the incomplete diffusion of the state in 
society meant that tribal life could adjust to the state through a gradual 
and lengthy process of mutual learning. In Hodeida, for example, the 
commerce-based, “modern” rationality of city governance emerged out 
of a “traditional” base rather than in opposition to it.6 The outcome was 
flexible tribalism in which the tribe functioned as a voluntary network, 
with tribal solidarity being exchangeable for, shared or coextensive 
with other types of group solidarity. This flexibility may in part account 
for the unique democratic development experienced by Yemen in re-
cent years, in spite of pervasive poverty and a heritage of civil wars. 
The surviving features of customary tribalism include voluntary asso-
ciation and coexistence of tribal identity with other forms of associa-
tion. Another includes the extension of tribal ethics of mutual help into 
diasporic Yemeni networks, stretching from Singapore to the suburban 
United States. These networks tend to revolve around extended kin, 
and owe their resilience, it seems, to the absence of obvious alterna-
tives, including state largesse. In many ways, therefore, Yemen exempli-
fies the path that has so far been most suitable for the maturation of 
the civic traditions of tribalism in particular into the fabric of modern 
society. 
Other categories provide us with different kinds of nuance. The millet 
system, for example, included features analogous to modern nationalism, 
notably the notion that certain additional rights could be guaranteed or 
claimed only through specific forms of association. As it morphed into 
the modern nation-state, one option for the millet was to seek to evolve 
into a nation. And at that point it ceased to be an element of civil society. 
The consequences of this transformation were usually highly unpleas-
ant, as evidenced in the Balkans and the Lebanese civil wars. 
The point is that exploring various historical social categories in 
terms of civil society always reveals dynamics that have great and un-
expected implications for public life, and especially regarding what tra-
jectory that category would follow once it is contaminated by statist 
logic. Some categories have an inherent propensity to remain resolute-
ly autonomous from the state, and it is in such cases that one may chart 
out the complex negotiations of ordinary social conservatism and the 
voluntary transformations of civic culture. As one such category the 
“family,” for example, while inhabiting the private sphere, also provides 
the building materials of the public sphere.7 Other historical examples 
include merchant communities, and Shelomoh D. Goitein’s seminal 
work A Mediterranean Society, showed how these provided a basis of 
civic public life. The same can be said of the role of the ayan, who are 
portrayed in recent studies of urban history to have played a central 
role in fostering public life, mediating between clients and state, and 
fostering the embeddedness of their cities in regional urban networks.8 
What is evident from these histories is that the attempted destruction 
of historic civil societies in the Middle East by modern states, whether 
through coercion or cooptation, has led to street level politics and vio-
lence as the only possible politics of opposition, as illustrated below.   
Civil society relates to the state in three basic ways: as an element in 
democratizing the state; as a support pillar of the state; and as an alter-
native to the state. Civil society can of course oscillate between these 
roles, even in the same environment and within a short period. But 
what long-term structures and attitudes survive temporary or contin-
gent oscillations? A survey of the genealogies of civil society in Islamic 
history would reveal, I suspect, that it was usually the third attitude 
that defined the long-range view of the state by the actors of civil soci-
ety. The fact that civil society is now being paraded as a foundation of 
the democratic state is probably more due to the need to reduce the 
heavy weight of the state itself rather than to a 
discovery of an old or natural dynamic. 
But once the state’s power over and reach 
within society become again limited—a de-
velopment that is also contingent on external 
geopolitical factors and not only on what civil 
society does—civil society will turn back in 
its historic form as the natural alternative to a 
state that can be expected to do nothing for its 
people and everything for its elites, as it had 
always done. It took only about three decades 
after the death of Muhammad for the early 
Muslim community to discover that harsh fact 
and readjust its civic life accordingly. When this 
very old fact regarding the externality of the 
prince to the principality is highlighted again, 
civil society in Muslim lands may respond 
by reasserting itself as a direct participant in 
world affairs, rather than delegate the task to 
states which can always be counted upon to 
act in their own interest and no one else’s. It 
is not government and rulers, but civil society 
that has always humanized our past, and now 
it appears, our future. 
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